BOMBING AS A POLICY TOOL IN VIETNAM: EFFECTIVENESS
A STAFF STUDY BASED ON THE PENTAGON PAPERS
Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Study No. 5
Full text available at: http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/bombing_tool.htm#fn33
When the bombing of North Vietnam began in early 1965, the public rationale was the reduction of the flow of supplies and men to the South…In private, however, the rationale for the bombing was a mixture of complex and often conflicting objectives. The situation in South Vietnam seemed to be falling apart. The bombing of the North, it was hoped, would boost morale in the South, show the determination of the United States, and break the will of the North to continue its aggression…
As an agricultural country, North Vietnam provides an extremely poor target for an air attack. The theory of either strategic or interdiction bombing assumed highly developed industrial nations producing large quantities of military goods to sustain mass armies engaged in intensive warfare. NVN, as US intelligence agencies knew, was an agricultural country with a rudimentary transportation system and little industry of any kind. Nearly all of the people were rice farmers who worked the land with water buffaloes and hand tools, and whose well-being at a subsistence level was almost entirely dependent on what they grew or made themselves…
In short, North Vietnam’s industry did not provide a rewarding target for an air attack. Meaningful targets were few, and those that existed were critical to neither the viability of the economy nor the prosecution of the war in the South…
…[Another factor] reducing the effectiveness of the bombing of the North has been the resourcefulness and determination of the North Vietnamese. During the massive bombing of their petroleum facilities, for example, they proved quite resourceful. Distribution was switch from bulk to barrels and decentralized without a major reduction in capabilities. The North has also adapted well to the continuing attacks on the transportation system…
One of the most pervasive justifications for the bombing of the North is the belief that in some degree the bombing will put pressure on the Hanoi leadership to terminate the war. According to the Pentagon history of the conflict, this was the original purpose of the sustained bombing of the North, although the public rationale was generally put in terms of North Vietnam’s capability to continue the war…
The experience in bombing North Vietnam, then, appears to once again demonstrate that an attack by a clearly foreign power tends to increase support for the indigenous government and to increase social cohesion in spite of the hardships created by the war. The persistence of the view that Hanoi’s will can be broken by bombing seems inconsistent with what is known of the North Vietnamese leadership. Most of Hanoi’s top leadership is composed of long-time revolutionaries who were intimately involved with Vietnam’s struggle for independence from the French. Their struggle lasting over 30 years indicates tenacity and will not easily [be] broken. Moreover, as both communists and nationalists, they apparently believe that they have a mission to liberate what they consider to be the southern half of their country. Their statements during the long period of negotiations leave little doubt that they think that time, international opinion, the weight of history, and their own commitment will bring them victory.
Document Based Questions
1) Who is the author of this document? Who is the intended audience? What is the subject of the document?
2) What is the overall opinion of the committee on the effectiveness of bombing in North Vietnam (NVN)?
3) What were the reasons given by the American government for bombing NVN? Which of these are the strongest? The weakest?
4) What other choices, military or diplomatic options, if any, did the United States have to use against NVN?
5) What choices did the North Vietnamese make in response to the bombing of their country? What were the costs of those choices?
6) How do you think the North Vietnamese people felt about bombing a foreign power dropping bombs on their country?
7) How was the decision to drop bombs on NVN an important signal from the United States about their intentions in the War? How was NVN’s response significant in determining the outcome of the war?
Source: Relations, U. S. C. S. C. o. F., & Biles, R. E. (1972). Bombing as a Policy Tool in Vietnam: Effectiveness: A Staff Study Based on the Pentagon Papers, October 12, 1972: U.S. Government Printing Office.
A STAFF STUDY BASED ON THE PENTAGON PAPERS
Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Study No. 5
Full text available at: http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/bombing_tool.htm#fn33
When the bombing of North Vietnam began in early 1965, the public rationale was the reduction of the flow of supplies and men to the South…In private, however, the rationale for the bombing was a mixture of complex and often conflicting objectives. The situation in South Vietnam seemed to be falling apart. The bombing of the North, it was hoped, would boost morale in the South, show the determination of the United States, and break the will of the North to continue its aggression…
As an agricultural country, North Vietnam provides an extremely poor target for an air attack. The theory of either strategic or interdiction bombing assumed highly developed industrial nations producing large quantities of military goods to sustain mass armies engaged in intensive warfare. NVN, as US intelligence agencies knew, was an agricultural country with a rudimentary transportation system and little industry of any kind. Nearly all of the people were rice farmers who worked the land with water buffaloes and hand tools, and whose well-being at a subsistence level was almost entirely dependent on what they grew or made themselves…
In short, North Vietnam’s industry did not provide a rewarding target for an air attack. Meaningful targets were few, and those that existed were critical to neither the viability of the economy nor the prosecution of the war in the South…
…[Another factor] reducing the effectiveness of the bombing of the North has been the resourcefulness and determination of the North Vietnamese. During the massive bombing of their petroleum facilities, for example, they proved quite resourceful. Distribution was switch from bulk to barrels and decentralized without a major reduction in capabilities. The North has also adapted well to the continuing attacks on the transportation system…
One of the most pervasive justifications for the bombing of the North is the belief that in some degree the bombing will put pressure on the Hanoi leadership to terminate the war. According to the Pentagon history of the conflict, this was the original purpose of the sustained bombing of the North, although the public rationale was generally put in terms of North Vietnam’s capability to continue the war…
The experience in bombing North Vietnam, then, appears to once again demonstrate that an attack by a clearly foreign power tends to increase support for the indigenous government and to increase social cohesion in spite of the hardships created by the war. The persistence of the view that Hanoi’s will can be broken by bombing seems inconsistent with what is known of the North Vietnamese leadership. Most of Hanoi’s top leadership is composed of long-time revolutionaries who were intimately involved with Vietnam’s struggle for independence from the French. Their struggle lasting over 30 years indicates tenacity and will not easily [be] broken. Moreover, as both communists and nationalists, they apparently believe that they have a mission to liberate what they consider to be the southern half of their country. Their statements during the long period of negotiations leave little doubt that they think that time, international opinion, the weight of history, and their own commitment will bring them victory.
Document Based Questions
1) Who is the author of this document? Who is the intended audience? What is the subject of the document?
2) What is the overall opinion of the committee on the effectiveness of bombing in North Vietnam (NVN)?
3) What were the reasons given by the American government for bombing NVN? Which of these are the strongest? The weakest?
4) What other choices, military or diplomatic options, if any, did the United States have to use against NVN?
5) What choices did the North Vietnamese make in response to the bombing of their country? What were the costs of those choices?
6) How do you think the North Vietnamese people felt about bombing a foreign power dropping bombs on their country?
7) How was the decision to drop bombs on NVN an important signal from the United States about their intentions in the War? How was NVN’s response significant in determining the outcome of the war?
Source: Relations, U. S. C. S. C. o. F., & Biles, R. E. (1972). Bombing as a Policy Tool in Vietnam: Effectiveness: A Staff Study Based on the Pentagon Papers, October 12, 1972: U.S. Government Printing Office.